I took several classics with me, mainly to learn something about Japan
while I’m here:
戴季陶’s
日本论
新都户稻造’s
武士道
Ruth Benedict’s The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (菊与刀),
and
Andrew Gordon’s A Modern History of Japan (standard text for
university)
Ironically, it’s Kissinger’s “On China”, a book I didn’t initially intend
to bring (because it is thick and not about Japan), that’s completely engrossed
me in the past few days. Back in college, I had read 2/3 of Kissinger’s “Diplomacy”
as required reading for Harvard’s Hist A12, the well-known “Conflict and
Cooperation” class. I recall at the time being awe-struck by Kissinger’s fluid
prose, intricate analysis, and succinct yet penetrating summaries. Particularly
the early chapters on European balance of power politics until the outbreak of World
War I, more than any other author I’ve read, Kissinger made the theory and
practice of politics and diplomacy at once accessible and enlightening.
”On China” has all the hallmark of a Kissinger masterpiece, and again,
the early chapters I believe are the highlights. Tracing the origins of Chinese
political worldview from the myth of the Yellow Emperor, to the empire’s rise
to preeminence and subsequent decline, to Mao’s declaration in 1949 that the
Chinese people “have stood up”, the first 90 pages is a concise primer on
modern Chinese history and a penetrating appraisal of the Chinese political
psyche, written with a familiarity, available only to someone who has practiced
at the highest levels of Sino-US relations for five decades.
Building on this foundation, the next 450 pages mainly analyse and
account the evolution of Sino-US relations from Mao to Deng to Jiang on the
Chinese side and Nixon to Bush (senior) presidencies on the US side. The best
parts here were his account of the intricacies of US-China détente, Mao and
Deng’s motivations for war in Korea and Vietnam, and Sino-Soviet split. It’s been
typical to view 1949 as a break in China’s historical development. Kissinger,
however, deftly show and repeatedly emphasize that continuities in self
perception and world view among Chinese statesmen are crucial to understanding the
Chinese concept of world order and their strategic decision making. These pages
are well written also, but maybe these events are relatively recent, or others
have written prolifically on similar topics, I came away still thinking the
first 90 pages were the best.
Some quotes which I thought were illuminating:
Unlike conventional states, which “cherish a tale of their origin, a
special feature of Chinese civilization is that it seems to have no beginning… The
Yellow Emperor has gone down in history as a founding hero; yet in the founding
myth, he is reestablishing, not creating, and empire. China predated him; it
strides in to the historical consciousness as an established state requiring only
restoration, not creation.”
On the nature of the Chinese state: “the borders between China and the
surrounding peoples were not so much political and territorial demarcations as cultural
differentiations… in the modern age, China remains a ‘civilization pretending
to be a nation-state’.”
On Chinese relationship to religion: “China produced no religious
themes in the Western sense at all. The Chinese never generated a myth of
cosmic creation. Their universe was created by the Chinese themselves, whose
values, even when declared of universal applicability, were conceived of as
Chinese in origin.”
On China’s historical geopolitical situation, and remarkably relevant
still today: “Individually, neighboring peoples could pose formidable threats;
with any degree of unity, they would be overwhelming… The Great Wall, so prominent
in Western iconography of China, was a reflection of this basic vulnerability,
though rarely a successful solution to it. Instead, Chinese statesmen relied on
a rich array of diplomatic and economic instruments to draw potentially hostile
foreigners into relationships the Chinese could manage.”
And commenting on China’s depredation in the later Qing years: “Chinese
statesmen played their weak hand with considerable skill … From the point of
view of the balance of power, the objective configuration of forces would have
suggested the impossibility of China’s survival as a unitary, continent-sized
state. But … China eventually overcame its travails by its own efforts. Through
a painful and often humiliating process, China’s statesmen in the end preserved
the moral and territorial claims of their disintegrating world order.”
After reading the book, one can clearly see Kissinger’s respect for Mao
(“philosopher-king”) is close to being on par with his veneration of Sun Tze’s “Art
of War” (whom he credits also for providing Vietnam with tactical and strategic
advantages in the Second Vietnam War). Next in the rung is Deng (“battle-hardened
guardian of the national interest”. Then Zhou (“the mandarin” who “conducted
conversations with … effortless grace and superior intelligence”). Kissinger
had also high praises for Jiang, Zhu Rongji and Qian Qichen for following
through with Deng’s vision and building up China’s modern economy.
The upheavals since 1840 severely challenged the Middle Kingdom’s traditional
notion of political ‘singularity’, cultural superiority, economic independence,
and aloof isolation. In the 19th and early 20th
centuries, the primary forces were military and the devastating defeats coalesced
a modern nationalism and prompted generations of deep and painful soul-searching.
While the China that emerged post 1949 is a more conventional nation
state that has let go of much of the pretensions of the Middle Kingdom, it has not
abdicated the notion of the its exceptionalism. To a large extent, the exceptionalism
espoused by the Middle Kingdom, was made possible by its regional preeminence
and sustained by distances insurmountable by then available technology. As those
barriers broke down in the early 19th century, China descended into
100 years of chaos and deprivation.
The question could be asked in today’s vastly more interconnected
world, to what extent is exceptionalism as a concept sustainable, not just for
China, but also for other nations espousing similar ideals. China’s lesson is
perhaps that exceptionalism made possible by preeminence, however long and
secure it may seem, is nevertheless a shaky foundation for a modern nation
state. As we observe our condition with humility and see through to those
patterns of our shared humanity, the future for all of us is more alike than
different.
